1
Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University South Tehran Branch
2
Master of Art, Islamic Azad University South Tehran Branch
Abstract
Through a rent-seeking model, this article analyses the relationship between institutional quality and oil rents. It is claimed that for each country, a threshold exists, such that beyond this point, any additional amounts of oil rent begin to have a negative impact on institutional quality. If oil rent is lower than its critical threshold, the country’s economy still performs well, but, as the oil rent increases, the expected return of the rent-seeking behavior is elevated. This, in turn, lowers the quality of institutions. This relationship is illustrated by an inverse U-shaped curve. Our empirical study confirms such an inverse U-shaped curve for oil-based economies for the years 1996-2011. Also relationships prove to exist between oil rents and such indices as role of law, control of corruption, voice and accountability, and political stability.
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Tofighi, H. and Yahyavi Razlighi, H. (2016). The Effect of Oil rents on the Institutional Quality in Oil-Based Economies. The Journal of Economic Policy, 8(16), 21-40.
MLA
Tofighi, H. , and Yahyavi Razlighi, H. . "The Effect of Oil rents on the Institutional Quality in Oil-Based Economies", The Journal of Economic Policy, 8, 16, 2016, 21-40.
HARVARD
Tofighi, H., Yahyavi Razlighi, H. (2016). 'The Effect of Oil rents on the Institutional Quality in Oil-Based Economies', The Journal of Economic Policy, 8(16), pp. 21-40.
CHICAGO
H. Tofighi and H. Yahyavi Razlighi, "The Effect of Oil rents on the Institutional Quality in Oil-Based Economies," The Journal of Economic Policy, 8 16 (2016): 21-40,
VANCOUVER
Tofighi, H., Yahyavi Razlighi, H. The Effect of Oil rents on the Institutional Quality in Oil-Based Economies. The Journal of Economic Policy, 2016; 8(16): 21-40.