تنظیم قوانین و مقررات در نظام بانکی ایران با تأکید بر نقش مجلس و قانون‌گذاران: رویکرد نظریه بازی‌ها

Extended Abstract



Purpose: The primary objective of this article is to thoroughly examine and analyze the role of legislators and parliament in the regulation of banking practices and its impact on financial stability and trust in the financial system. This study specifically focuses on the significance of regulatory responses to innovative challenges in financial technologies, such as digital currencies, and their effects on traditional financial systems. Utilizing game theory, the current research analyzes the structure of interactions among key players such as the government, parliament, banks, and customers. It demonstrates how differences in preferences and resources can lead to various equilibrium scenarios in regulatory settings. The study emphasizes that the formulation of laws and regulations should aim to foster stability, promote innovation, and ensure economic and social sustainability, with parliament and legislators playing a crucial role in guiding this process. This paper, by examining historical experiences and international comparisons, proposes strategies to address misalignments and power differentials among stakeholders to achieve more desirable equilibriums.

Methodology: This study employs a graph model within the framework of game theory to analyze the balance of interests among stakeholders in the regulatory settings of the banking sector in Iran. This method, developed by Feng et al. (2005) and Wong et al. (2018), is utilized to examine conflicts in arenas with multiple actors and diverse options. The modeling in the graph model includes defining possible moves and hypothetical conflict scenarios following the identification of stakeholders and their demands. This process, employing techniques such as weighting options and prioritizing, contributes to the evaluation system. The GMCR+ software is used for modeling and analyzing conflicts, providing the capability for more precise analysis and examination of equilibrium states (Feng et al., 2003). This approach not only focuses on strategic analysis but also offers deeper insights and practical solutions to improve current conditions and achieve balance in the banking network. The research utilizes interviews as a data collection tool, and analyses are based on the principle of theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1986).

Findings and Discussion: This study employs game theory and graph modeling to analyze the equilibrium of stakeholder interests in the regulatory framework of banking in Iran. By identifying five key players and ten possible options for these actors, a comprehensive analysis of potential conflicts and equilibria within this sector is presented. The modeling in the graph model includes defining possible moves and hypothetical conflict scenarios, identified through semi-structured interviews with stakeholders.

The application of game theory allows for a more detailed observation and analysis of equilibrium states and strategic decision-making by the actors. The analysis reveals that some options are simultaneously incompatible and cannot coexist in a common state. These conflicts assist in eliminating impossible states from the game space, resulting in the identification of possible and stable equilibrium states.

Using the GMCR+ software for modeling and conflict analysis, the analyses indicate that Equilibrium 9 is the most stable state among the possible scenarios. In this state, legislators and regulatory bodies focus on drafting preventive laws, banks actively comply with regulations, and customers carefully select financial services. This state represents a strong equilibrium in the game, where there are fewer changes made by the actors to improve the situation.

Reverse game analysis suggests that changes in the preferences and strategies of the actors may facilitate reaching more optimal equilibrium states. This analysis enables policymakers to design more effective policies for managing stakeholders in the banking sector by better understanding the dynamics and interactions among the actors.

The findings of this research can assist policymakers and market regulators in gaining a better understanding of the dynamics present in banking regulation and moving towards more stable and desirable equilibria using optimal strategies. The research also demonstrates that collaboration and interaction among various actors can lead to the creation of new and more beneficial equilibria in the banking system, which can serve as a key strategy for addressing future challenges in this sector.

Conclusion and Policy Implications: The current research focuses on the strategic equilibria of actors within the regulatory framework of banking, emphasizing that various stakeholders such as legislators, regulatory bodies, banks, financial institutions, customers, borrowers, investors, and international organizations each pursue unique strategies that lead to diverse equilibria within the banking system. Analyses indicate that these strategies play a significant role in achieving new and stable equilibria. The study reveals that Equilibrium 9 is a point where actors maintain their strategies without the inclination to change. This state is considered a stable and pivotal condition in banking strategies, representing stability and attractiveness, and provides various options for the actors involved.

Reverse game analysis also suggests that the current equilibrium state may not be the most desirable for policymakers and society, highlighting the need for a change in the role of legislators and regulatory bodies to recognize emerging technologies. This research stresses that regulatory policies in banking should be flexible and dynamic enough to adapt to continual environmental changes, supporting ongoing stability and growth in the banking sector.